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Motivation
Competition
In many markets competition is present in the form of oligopolies
(regulations, barriers to entry, mergers, acquisitions, alliances).
In transportation, deregulation often led to oligopolistic markets.
Airlines
Railways
Buses
Multi-modal networks
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Motivation
How to study competitive transport markets?
Modelling demand
Modelling supply
Modelling competition
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Motivation
Demand
Each customer chooses the alternative that maximizes his/her utility.
Customers have different tastes and socioeconomic characteristics
that influence their choice.
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Motivation
Supply
Operators take decisions that optimize their objective function
(e.g. revenue maximization).
Decisions can be related to pricing, capacity, frequency, availability ...
Decisions are influenced by:
The preferences of the customers
The decisions of the competitors
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Motivation
Competition
We consider non-cooperative games.
We aim at understanding the Nash equilibrium solutions of such
games, i.e. stationary states of the system in which no competitor has
an incentive to change its decisions.
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Modelling the problem
The framework
Three elements to be modelled: customers, operators and market.
1 Customers: discrete choice models take into account preference
heterogeneity and model individual decisions.
2 Operators: a mixed integer program can maximize any relevant
objective function.
3 Market: Nash equilibrium solutions are found by enforcing best
response constraints.
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Modelling the problem
The framework: customer level
Non-linear formulation:
The probability of customer n ∈ N choosing alternative i ∈ I depends on the
discrete choice model specification.
For the logit model, there exists a closed-form expression:
Pin =
exp(Vin)∑
j∈I exp(Vjn)
For other discrete choice models, there is no closed-form expression.
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Modelling the problem
The framework: customer level
Linear formulation:
A linear formulation can be obtained by relying on simulation to draw from
the distribution of the error term of the utility function.
For all customers and all alternatives, R draws of are extracted from the error
term distribution. Each ξinr corresponds to a different behavioral scenario.
Uinr = βinpin + qin + ξinr
In each scenario, customers choose the alternative with the highest utility:
winr = 1 if Uinr = max
j∈I
Ujnr , and winr = 0 otherwise
Over multiple scenarios, the probability of customer n choosing alternative i
is given by
Pin =
∑
r∈R winr
R
.
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Modelling the problem
The framework: operators level
We assume that an operator k ∈ K can decide on the price pin of each
alternative i ∈ I for all customers n ∈ N.
Stackelberg game: the operator (the leader) knows the best response of the
customers (”collective” follower) to all strategies.
Objective function to be maximized by operator k :
Vk =
∑
i∈I
∑
n∈N
pinPin
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Modelling the problem
Non-linear optimization model for a single operator
max V =
∑
i∈I
∑
n∈N
pinPin
s.t. Pin =
exp(Uin)∑
j∈I exp(Ujn)
∀i ∈ I , ∀n ∈ N
Uin = βinpin + qin ∀i ∈ I , ∀n ∈ N
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Modelling the problem
Linear optimization model for a single operator
max V =
∑
i∈I
∑
n∈N
pinPin
s.t. Pin =
∑
r∈R winr
R
∀i ∈ I , ∀n ∈ N
Uinr = βinpin + qin + ξinr ∀i ∈ I , ∀n ∈ N, ∀r ∈ R
Uinr ≤ Unr ∀i ∈ I , ∀n ∈ N, ∀r ∈ R
Unr ≤ Uinr + MUnr (1− winr ) ∀i ∈ I , ∀n ∈ N, ∀r ∈ R∑
i∈I
winr = 1 ∀n ∈ N, ∀r ∈ R
winr ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ I , ∀n ∈ N, ∀r ∈ R
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Modelling the problem
The framework: market level
The payoff of an operator also depends on the strategies of the competitors.
Let’s define as Xk the set of strategies that can be played by operator
k ∈ K .
Condition for Nash equilibrium (best response constraints):
Vk = V
∗
k = max
xk∈Xk
Vk(xk , xK\{k}) ∀k ∈ K
Nash (1951): finite games have at least one mixed strategy equilibrium
solution.
Finite/infinite strategy sets; pure/mixed strategies; continuous/discrete
payoff function.
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Modelling the problem
A fixed-point iteration method
Sequential algorithm to find Nash equilibrium solutions of a k-player
game:
Initialization: players select an initial feasible strategy.
Iterative phase: players take turns and each plays its best response pure
strategy to the current solution.
Termination criterion: either a Nash equilibrium or a cyclic equilibrium
is reached.
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Modelling the problem
A mixed integer model for the fixed-point problem
We can write a model that minimizes the distance between two
consecutive fixed-point iterations.
A solution for a two-operator problem: (xb1 , x
b
2 )
Optimization problems for the operators:
x∗1 = arg max
x1∈X1
V1(x1, x
b
2 )
x∗2 = arg max
x2∈X2
V2(x
b
1 , x2)
Fixed-point problem:
min
x1,x2,x∗1 ,x
∗
2
‖x∗1 − xb1 ‖+ ‖x∗2 − xb2 ‖
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Modelling the problem
Initial configuration
No optimization at operator level: any feasible strategy could be
selected.
Constraints:
Customer choice
Continuous (MINLP), or
Binary (MILP)
Customer utility maximization
∑
i∈I
wbinr = 1 ∀n ∈ N, ∀r ∈ R
Ubinr = βinp
b
in + qin + ξinr ∀i ∈ I , ∀n ∈ N, ∀r ∈ R
Ubinr ≤ Ubnr ∀i ∈ I , ∀n ∈ N, ∀r ∈ R
Ubnr ≤ zbinr + M(1− wbinr ) ∀i ∈ I , ∀n ∈ N, ∀r ∈ R
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Modelling the problem
Best response configurations
Each operator solves an optimization problem having the following
constraints:
Customer choice
Continuous (MINLP), or
Binary (MILP)
Customer utility maximization
Best response
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Modelling the problem
Best response configurations
Best response constraints:
Vks =
1
R
∑
i∈Ik
∑
n∈N
∑
r∈R
pinsw
a
inrs ∀k ∈ K , ∀s ∈ Sk
Vks ≤ Vmaxks ∀s ∈ Sk
Vmaxks ≤ Vks + M(1− xks ) ∀s ∈ Sk∑
s∈S
xks = 1
Customer constraints:
Uainrs = βinpins + qin + ξinr ∀i ∈ Ik , ∀n ∈ N, ∀r ∈ R, ∀s ∈ Sk
Uainrs = U
b
inr ∀i ∈ I \ Ik , ∀n ∈ N, ∀r ∈ R, ∀s ∈ Sk∑
i∈I
wainrs = 1 ∀n ∈ N, ∀r ∈ R, ∀s ∈ Sk
Uainrs ≤ Uanrs ∀i ∈ I , ∀n ∈ N, ∀r ∈ R, ∀s ∈ Sk
Uanrs ≤ zainrs + M(1− wainrs ) ∀i ∈ I , ∀n ∈ N, ∀r ∈ R, ∀s ∈ Sk
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Modelling the problem
Objective function
Minimization problem:
z∗ = min
x1,x2,x∗1 ,x
∗
2
‖x∗1 − xb1 ‖+ ‖x∗2 − xb2 ‖
If z∗ = 0, we have an equilibrium. What can we say about this
equilibrium?
If z∗ > 0, can we conclude something? Are we in an equilibrium
region?
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Modelling the problem
Numerical experiments
Case study: 3 parking choices. 2 owned by 2 different operators and 1
opt-out option. Parameter estimation available in the literature.
Tests: non-linear and linear formulations with logit and mixed logit
specifications.
Non-linear Linear
Logit - ξ
Mixed logit β β, ξ
Figure: Random draws needed in the different sets of experiments
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Modelling the problem
Numerical experiments
Model specification: drawing from the error term distribution
(R = 50, 100, 200) gives good approximation of the choice
probabilities found with the logit formula.
Preliminary results: equilibrium solutions are found for all tested
instances with the MILP formulation.
Computational times:
Logit:
The non-linear model is faster (no need for simulation).
The time required by the linear model increases with the number of
draws.
Mixed logit:
The non-linear model (highly non convex) does not converge for larger
instances.
The linear model outperforms the non-linear model on larger instances.
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Future work
Open questions and future work
The current model uses finite strategy sets (i.e. price discretization).
Is it possible to reformulate the problem with the help of
complementarity?
How can the structure of the problem be exploited to efficiently
search for equilibria in the solution space?
Is it possible to compare different equilibrium solution or to prove
uniqueness within a region of the solution space?
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Future work
Questions?
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